

*The Director*

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14 January 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, USIB

SUBJECT : Secretariat Summary of USIB Agenda for 16 January

Item 1 Minutes of 9 January Meeting

Draft has been circulated by the Exec Sec for USIB approval;

Sponsor - [Redacted]

Item 2 Watch Report

Draft by Watch Committee to be circulated for Board approval;

Sponsor - [Redacted]

Item 3 SNIE on The Pacification Effort in Vietnam

BNE draft coordinated with USIB Representatives for USIB approval;

Sponsor - [Redacted]

This SNIE was requested by Mr. Rostow for completion before the change in administration. The various components of CIA were quite helpful in the preparation and coordination of this draft. While there were some differences of views in coordinating this paper with the USIB Representatives State has taken the only reservation (2nd sentence of paragraph 22). State dropped the other reservations indicated in your draft. The State Representatives are, however, uneasy about the estimate which they feel is probably too optimistic.

The reservation in paragraph 22 is a basic one in that State does not believe, as the draft contends, that the pacification program is less vulnerable than in late 1967. [Redacted] may argue at the USIB that comparisons of this kind serve no useful purpose, since a number of other comparisons could be made. BNE believes that a judgment is called for since one of the main questions on pacification and indeed on the entire situation in Vietnam, is whether once again, as before Tet, claims of progress are misleading and the situation is not actually improved. BNE thinks, considering all factors, that the overall situation has improved, at least enough so that a Communist counter-attack against the pacification can be resisted with better results than at Tet. At present all other USIB Representatives stand by this judgment.

BNE is not aware of any other problems but believes that, in view of the controversial nature of the subject, other points may be brought up once the Principals have had a chance to examine the paper.

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Item 4 Post Mortem on the Czech Crisis

Proposal by Chairman, SWWG, that USIB note the subject report with annexes and consider a recommendation for a study group; Sponsor - General Taylor

Pursuant to your request in executive sessions at the 13 September and 10 October Board meetings, post mortem reports on the Czech crisis were prepared by CIA, DIA, NSA and INR. These reports were turned over to General Robert Taylor and his Strategic Warning Working Group (SWWG) for study and review.

In his memorandum to you which has been circulated to USIB Principals only, General Taylor presents as annexes the four agency reports (separately distributed), and a very brief summary of events and intelligence coverage prepared by SWWG. General Taylor also comments on the principal findings of the reports and identifies certain areas of possible improvement in intelligence performance which had been noted by the SWWG. These areas have recently been called to the attention of USIB members and when answers are received a consolidated report to you will be prepared.

In paragraph 4 of his covering memorandum General Taylor notes that the SWWG believes the Soviet actions during this period offer a unique opportunity to study the procedures utilized by the USSR to conduct military operations. Consequently, SWWG recommends that an intensive study of the evidence be made by an ad hoc group staffed by representatives from CIA, DIA, State, NSA, the military services and possibly the JCS.

This recommendation is the subject for USIB consideration at this meeting. General Taylor in his briefing memorandum for you suggests two ways of handling this proposal. A CIA briefing note is also to be available later today (Tuesday) or tomorrow.

[Redacted Signature]

Executive Secretary, USIB

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